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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1710

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

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USNMR SHAPE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0410

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JULY 21 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

BEGIN SUMMARY:

1. THE FINAL PLENARY MEETING OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE ON JULY WQM US REP AND SOVIET REP (KHLESTOV) MADE THE ONLY FORMAL STATEMENTS. US REP'S STATEMENT IS REPORTED BY SEPTTEL. IN HIS PRESENTATION, KHLESTOV CITED THE EAST'S FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL AND JUNE 10 TABLING OF DATA AS EVIDENCE OF EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO TAKE WESTERN POSITIONS INTO ACCOUNT, STRESSED THE EASTERN REQUIREMENT FOR EFFECTIVE FIRST STAGE GUARANTEES THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD TAKE PART IN SECOND STAGE REDUCTIONS, AND CALLED UPON THE WEST TO TABLE UPDATED DATA AND TO ABANDON ITS CONCEPT OF DISPARITIES SINCE THERE WAS, IN FACT, NO GREAT DIFFERENCE IN SIZE BETWEEN WARSAW PACT AND NAT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. END SUMMARY.

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2. AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE ORIGINAL RUSSIAN
LANGUAGE TEXT OF KHLESTOV'S STATEMENT FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

1. THE ROUND WHICH IS ENDING TODAY VIRTUALLY COMPLETES A THREE-YEAR PERIOD IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THREE YEARS IS A SUFFICIENT TIME TO MAKE SOME GENERALISATIONS CONCERNING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THEIR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT. IT IS EVIDENTLY NECESSARY, HAVING SURVEYED THE ROAD OVER WHICH WE HAVE PASSED, ONCE MORE TO EXPLAIN WHAT CHARACTERISES THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES AND WHAT NEW HAS BEEN INTRODUCED INTO THEM BY THIS LAST NINTH ROUND.

2. THE FAVOURABLE SIDE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE UP TO NOW CONSISTS IN OUR VIEW OF THE FACT THAT PARTICIPANTS IN THEM HAVE CONDUCTED A COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTIONS OF THE REDUCTION OF FORCES, AND HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PENETRATE NOT ONLY INTO THE SUBSTANCE BUT ALSO INTO THE DETAILS OF ONE ANOTHER'S POSITIONS. IN THE COURSE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS THE CIRCLE OF BASIC PROBLEMS HAS BEEN CLEARLY DELINEATED; ON THE SOLUTION OF THESE PROBLEMS THE ATTAINMENT OF AGREEMENT IN THE LAST ANALYSIS DEPENDS. IN A WORD, A SIGNIFICANT AND, FRANKLY SPEAKING, COMPLICATED WORK HAS BEEN DONE, AND IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO UNDERESTIMATE IT.

3. WE - AND THIS IS EVIDENT - ARE NOT SUPPORTERS OF A PESSIMISTIC ATTITUDE TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. BUT, HAVING GROWN USED TO ASSESSING WORK ABOVE ALL BY ITS RESULTS, WE CANNOT FEEL SATISFACTION. A GREAT RESPONSIBILITY LIES ON US. THE TIME HAS COME - AND EVIDENTLY IT CAME LONG AGO - WHEN THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXPECT FROM OUR NEGOTIATIONS PERCEPTIBLE PROGRESS IN THE CAUSE OF REDUCING ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

4. THE SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION IS BECOMING AN EVER MORE URGENT AND VITALLY IMPORTANT NECESSITY BOTH FOR THE PEOPLES
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OF THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE AND FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THAT IS WHY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE CPSU, L I BREZHNEV, IN HIS STATEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES OF EUROPE ON 29 JUNE THIS YEAR, PAID SUCH GREAT ATTENTION TO THE SUBJECT UNDER DISCUSSION IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS - THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AS WAS STRESSED IN THIS SPEECH, "TO CLEAR THE MINES AWAY FROM THE

POWDER - OR RATHER ATOMIC - MAGAZINE INTO WHICH EUROPE HAS BEEN TURNED TODAY IS NOT A SIMPLE MATTER. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAKE A START WITH REAL MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION".

5. THE SOVIET UNION, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER SOCIALIST STATES, CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL TO AIM AT CONCRETISING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE AND ATTAINING PRACTICAL RESULTS AT THEM. THIS IS A KIND OF CONSTANT FACTOR IN OUR APPROACH TO THE DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONS OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. HERE TOO, IN VIENNA THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS A CONSEQUENCE OF OUR FIRM CONVICTION THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD SIGNIFY AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS STRENGTHENING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE.

6. THE WAY TO AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN POINTED OUT IN THE PROGRAMME OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE ADVANCED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THIS PROGRAMME IS AIMED AT THE SOLUTION OF THE KEY QUESTIONS ON WHICH ABOVE ALL THE FATE OF A FUTURE AGREEMENT DEPENDS. AT ITS BASIS IS THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973, WHICH ENVISAGES THE REDUCTION BY MORE THAN 15 PER CENT OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE COURSE OF A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS. THE MEASURES PROPOSED BY THIS DRAFT LAY DOWN A PRECISE AND CLEAR PATH TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT WITH FULL OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL STATES, MUTUALITY OF REDUCTIONS, EQUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY SOVEREIGN STATES, AND OF NOT RECEIVING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

7. ALL THE OTHER PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, INTRODUCED WITH THE AIM OF ASSISTING THE ATTAINMENT OF THE GOAL OF OUR CONFIDENTIAL

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NEGOTIATIONS, ALSO CORRESPOND TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF A FUTURE REDUCTION, AS WELL AS IN GENERAL TO THE DECISIONS ADOPTED AT THE PREPARATORY TALKS. THEY ALL HAVE A CONSTRUCTIVE BUSINESSLIKE CHARACTER IMBUE WITH A DESIRE TO SEARCH OUT NEW POSSIBILITIES OF PRACTICAL MOVEMENT FORWARD.

8. ONE OF THE INITIATIVES OF SUCH A KIND IS THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES UNDER WHICH THE DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ASSUME AN OBLIGATION IN THE FORM OF A JOINT DECLARATION ON THE NON-INCREASE OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH THIS MEASURE WOULD BE OF A TEMPORARY CHARACTER, IT WOULD SHOW THE DESIRE OF THE STATES FOR THE REDUCTION OF FORCES MORE THAN ANY VERBAL DECLARATIONS, AND WOULD CREATE BETTER CONDITIONS FOR THE

ATTAINMENT OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES.

9. THE GOODWILL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES AND THEIR DESIRE TO FURTHER IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FIND THEIR REFLECTION, IN PARTICULAR, IN THE FACT THAT THE PROPOSALS WHICH THEY HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN MAKING TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS IN THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. READINESS HAS ALWAYS BEEN SHOWN ON OUR PART TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THOSE PROVISIONS OF THE WESTERN PLAN WHICH DO NOT CONTRADICT THE AGREED PRINCIPLES AND, ABOVE ALL, THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES.

10. IN THIS CONTEXT THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE UNDERTAKEN IN BOTH ROUNDS OF THE CURRENT YEAR, AS BEFORE, SERIOUS STEPS WHICH CREATE MORE FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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11. ON 19 FEBRUARY 1976 THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TABLED PROPOSALS WHICH WERE A SUBSTANTIAL ADDITION TO AND DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR PROGRAMME OF FORCE REDUCTION. IT INCLUDES A SERIES OF IMPORTANT POINTS OF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. WE EXPRESSED

OUR AGREEMENT TO MOVE TO A TWO PHASE REDUCTION OF FORCES, WHICH HAS ALWAYS BEEN REGARDED AS ONE OF THE MAIN ELEMENTS IN THE APPROACH OF THE NATO COUNTRIES TO REDUCTION. THE FACT THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS ARE MAKING EFFORTS TO BELITTLE THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS STEP ON THE PART OF THE SOCIALIST STATES CANNOT BUT GIVE RISE TO AMAZEMENT. IF IT HAS FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW NO SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE AND, AS THEY SOMETIMES MAINTAIN, HAS A "PROCEDURAL CHARACTER", THEN WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXPECT OF THE NATO STATES A READINESS TO PROCEED TO THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES ALREADY IN THE FIRST STAGE. WE FOR OUR PART ARE EVEN NOW CONVINCED THAT THE SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTION BY ALL ELEVEN DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING IS THE MOST CORRECT APPROACH AND FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLES.

12. ANOTHER IMPORTANT COMPROMISE ELEMENT IN OUR PROPOSAL IS
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THE READINESS EXPRESSED BY US TO ACCEPT THAT IN THE FIRST STAGE THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE USA ALONE SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION AND THAT IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS IN AN AGREEMENT ON A FIRST STAGE OF REDUCTION SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES. WE IMAGINE THAT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE ABLE TO ASSESS IN AN UNBIASED WAY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STEP. ONE WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TOO WILL SOON MAKE STEPS ON A SIMILAR SCALE TOWARDS OUR POSITIONS.

13. FINALLY, YET ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE WESTERN POSITION HAS BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY US. WE AGREED THAT THE DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES OTHER THAN THE USSR AND THE USA, WHILE REDUCING THEIR FORCES ONLY IN A SECOND STAGE SHOULD CONFINE THEMSELVES IN THE FIRST STAGE TO THE "FREEZING" OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES, AND ALSO TO AN OBLIGATION OF A GENERAL CHARACTER CONCERNING THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND STAGE. OF COURSE SUCH AN OBLIGATION CANNOT BUT INCLUDE THE MINIMUM NECESSARY IN ORDER TO CREATE GUARANTEES OF A REAL REDUCTION IN THE FORCES OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA IN THE SECOND STAGE. OTHERWISE THERE IS NO SENSE IN SUCH OBLIGATIONS. IT MUST BE CLEARLY INDICATED IN THEM BY WHAT TIME LIMIT AND IN WHAT QUANTITY THE FORCES OF THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, APART FROM THE USSR AND THE USA, WILL BE REDUCED AS A RESULT OF THE SECOND STAGE OF REDUCTION. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CANNOT CONTINUE TO REFUSE THIS MINIMUM WITHOUT RUNNING THE RISK OF MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO TRUST IN THEIR STATEMENTS OF READINESS TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES IN A SECOND STAGE.

14. IN THE COURSE OF THE ROUND WHICH IS NOW ENDING WE HAVE MADE

YET ANOTHER IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REPEATEDLY MAINTAINED THAT WITHOUT AN EXCHANGE OF NUMERICAL DATA ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES OF NATO AND OF THE WARSAW PACT IN CENTRAL EUROPE IT IS, SO THEY ALLEGE, IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE ON ALL THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTIONS. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT WE HAVE A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW ON THIS COUNT; WE CONSIDER THESE ASSERTIONS ON THE PART OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS WRONG. THE KEY QUESTIONS
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ON WHICH THE WORKING OUT OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES ABOVE ALL DEPENDS SHOULD TAKE PRIORITY OVER ALL OTHER SUBJECTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING THE NUMERICAL DATA. BUT ALTHOUGH THESE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS ARE STILL VERY FAR FROM SOLUTION, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THE COURSE OF THE NINTH ROUND, WITH THE AIM OF MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD, ADVANCED CORRESPONDING DATA CONCERNING THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT IN CENTRAL EUROPE, INCLUDING DATA ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE GROUND FORCES ON 1 JANUARY 1976.

15. THE FACT THAT THE DELEGATIONS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES, WHO HAVE ARGUED SO MUCH CONCERNING THE NECESSITY FOR EXCHANGING NUMERICAL DATA, HAVE ON THEIR SIDE TURNED OUT NOT TO BE READY FOR SUCH AN EXCHANGE APPEARS T US VERY STRANGE. WE HAVE ALREADY BEEN WAITING FOR ALMOST A MONTH AND A HALF FOR NUMERICAL DATA ON THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF ALL THE NATO COUNTRIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. ONE CANNOT HELP ASKING IN WHAT CONNECTION WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SO STUBBORNLY INSISTED ON AN EXCHANGE OF FIGURES - WHETHER IT IS REALLY THE EXAMINATION OF PRACTICAL POINTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OR IN ORDER TO EVADE THE SOLUTION OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS UNDER DISCUSSION IN VIENNA.

16. THUS IT IS THE TURN OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS TO MOVE, AND NOT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE EXCHANGE OF NUMERICAL DATA. WE PROCEED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE NUMEROUS STEPS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES WITH THE AIM OF ATTAINING AGREEMENT WILL HELP THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO SHOW REALISM, WHICH MEANS TO RENOUNCE THEIR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO THE BENEFIT OF THE NATO COUNTRIES, AND TO GET DOWN TO WORKING OUT AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE AGREED PRINCIPLES. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, IF THEY REALLY WANT A FAVOURABLE OUTCOME TO THE NEGOTIATIONS, MUST FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE AND REALLY ASSIST IN THE WORKING OUT OF ELEMENTS IN A FUTURE AGREEMENT.

17. IT IS A QUESTION, ABOVE ALL, OF RECOGNISIZING THE FACT THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS

CHARACTERISED ESSENTIALLY BY EQUALITY. ONLY ON THIS REALISTIC
BASIS CAN ONE ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE NEGOTIATIONS:
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TO LOWER THE LEVEL OF CONCENTRATION OF ARMED FORCES AND
ARMAMENTS IN THE CENTRE OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT AND THUS
FURTHER GREATER STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE IN CONDITIONS
OF AN UNCHANGING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES.

18. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL COME TO
SUCH A CONCLUSION, IF THEY BASE THEMSELVES ON THE REAL DATA,
AND TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ALL COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES
WHICH GO TO MAKE UP THE PRESENT BALANCE OF ARMED FORCES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF NATO AND THE
WARSAW PACT, IE GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES AND UNITS
EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MOREOVER IT IS IMPORTANT
TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION NOT ONLY THE MANPOWER STRENGTH, BUT
ALSO ARMAMENTS. THE UNACCEPTABLE POSITION OF THE WESTERN
COUNTRIES, WHO ARE SO FAR UNWILLING, DESPITE THE AGREED SUBJECT
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, TO PROCEED TO THE REDUCTION OF
ARMAMENTS, WHICH IS ONE OF THE BASIC CONDITIONS OF ENSURING
MILITARY DETENTE IN THE CENTRE OF EUROPE, CANNOT FAIL TO GIVE
RISE TO AMAZEMENT.

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19. THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS DEPENDS TO A GREAT EXTENT ON HOW SOON THE WESTERN COUNTRIES RENOUNCE THEIR ARTIFICALLY CREATED CONCEPT OF "DISPARITIES" IN GROUND FORCES. THIS CONCEPT DISTORTS THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS AND LEADS TO THE EFFECTIVE DEPARTURE OF THE NATO COUNTRIES FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTENTS AND PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

20. THE CONCEPT OF "DISPARITIES" IS DIRECTED AT CHANGING TO THE ADVANTAGE OF NATO THAT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH HAS TAKEN SHAPE OVER A LONG TIME. IF ONE IS TO TAKE THE POST-WAR PERIOD, THEN FOR ALMOST A THIRD OF A CENTURY THE LEADERS OF THE STATES WHICH DISPOSE OF ARMED FORCES IN THIS AREA HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTING THEIR CONSTRUCTION WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF THE NUMEROUS FACTORS OF ENSURING THE SECURITY OF THEIR COUNTRIES. SUCH A CALCULATION AND ASSESSMENT BY EACH OF THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ITS OWN INTERESTS HAS LED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRESENT APPROXIMATE EQUALITY OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE CPSU, LI BREZHNEV, SPOKE OF THIS CONFIDENTIAL

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CLEARLY AND PRECISELY IN HIS SPEECH IN BERLIN ON 29 JUNE THIS YEAR. HE STATED: "IF ONE IS TO SPEAK OF CENTRAL EUROPE, THERE ARE HERE NO GREAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE DIMENSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO. THERE EXISTS, AND MOREOVER HAS ALREADY DONE SO FOR MANY YEARS, A MORE OR LESS IDENTICAL LEVEL OF THESE FORCES (WITH A CERTAIN DIFFERENCE IN THEIR PROFILES ON EACH SIDE). THE WESTERN POWERS KNOW THIS JUST AS WELL AS WE DO".

21. THUS THE DIFFERENCES OF PROFILE IN THE ARMED FORCES CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT IN ANY WAY SERVE AS A BASIS FOR DISTURBING THE EXISTING OVERALL EQUILIBRIUM. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL CONCERNING AN ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTION IS UNACCEPTABLE PRECISELY BECAUSE IT IS DERIVED FROM AN INADEQUATE APPRAISAL OF THE BALANCE OF ARMED FORCES ON THE BASIS OF ONLY ONE OF THEIR COMPONENTS - AND MOREOVER ACCORDING TO A NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES WHICH HAS BEEN CALCULATED IN A PREJUDICIAL MANNER. IN ADDITION, THIS COMPONENT IS SEEN NOT ONLY IN ISOLATION FROM THE OTHERS BUT ALSO IN FACT WITHOUT TAKING THEM INTO ACCOUNT. SUCH A DELIBERATE SELECTION OF CRITERIA, OF COURSE, ONLY UNDERLINES THE ILL-FOUNDED NATURE OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WHICH ENVISAGES REDUCTIONS OF

THE FORCES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ALMOST THREE TIMES
GREATER THAN THOSE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES.

22. IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY THE PROPOSAL FOR AN ASYMMETRICAL
REDUCTION THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AGAIN AND AGAIN REFER TO THE
SO-CALLED "GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR." WE HAVE ALREADY HAD OCCASION
MORE THAN OCE TO SPEAK OF THE UNFOUNDED NATURE OF THESE
REFERENCES. WE WISH THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD DRAW
A LINE UNDER THIS QUESTION, FINALLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
CERTAIN WELL KNOWN FACTS.

23. FIRST OF ALL, OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS BUT IN DIRECT
PROXIMITY TO IT, THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE VARIOUS TYPES OF ARMED
FORCES WITH A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF ARMAMENTS.

24. SECONDLY, THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS STATEMENTS BY WESTERN
GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY LEADERS CONCERNING THE BROAD POSSIBILITIES
FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES TO TRANSFER THEIR FORCES IN A VERY SHORT
PERIOD OF TIME INTO THE REDUCTION AREA, THAT IS DIRECTLY UP
TO THE BORDERS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.
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25. IT IS POSSIBLE TO PRODUCE VARIOUS QUOTATIONS OR FACTS
ON THIS SCORE. BUT IT IS NOT THE NUMBER OF THESE WHICH IS
IMPORTANT. THE PUBLIC OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IS
CONSTANTLY HEARING PRONOUNCEMENTS BY GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY
FIGURES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES CONCERNING THE HIGH MILITARY
EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS ORGANISATION, THE MOBILITY OF ITS ARMED
FORCES, AND CONCERNING THE POWER OF THE MILITARY POTENTIAL WHICH
THE COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAVE IN THE CENTRE
OF THE CONTINENT AS WELL AS IN AREAS ADJACENT TO IT.

26. THUS, REFERENCES TO THE SO-CALLED "GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR",
TO WHICH THE DELEGATIONS OF THE WESTERN STATES ARE STILL
RESORTING, ARE NOT RECOGNISED AS WELL FOUNDED EVEN IN THE WEST.
RIGHT HERE IN VIENNA THEY ONLY HINDER THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS, DIVERTING THE DELEGATIONS FROM CONSIDERATION OF
THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARE OF THE ESSENCE OF THE MATTER. THEREFORE
IT IS NOT WORTHWHILE LOSING TIME IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE
"GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR" WHICH WAS ALREADY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN
THE AREA OF REDUCTION WAS DEFINED AT THE TIME OF THE
PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS.

27. NOW, THANKS TO THE INITIATIVE OF THE SOCIALIST STATES,
NEW POSSIBILITIES HAVE ARISEN IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS FOR
PROGRESS TOWARD THE WORKING OUT OF AN AGREEMENT. BUT THE ELEMENTS
OF A FUTURE AGREEMENT CAN BE DEVELOPED ONLY BY MEANS OF JOINT
EFFORTS. ONE CANNOT REGARD AS NORMAL THE STUBBORN RELUCTANCE
OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO DEPART FROM THEIR UNACCEPTABLE

POSITION. THUS EVEN THE VERY DECLARATIONS OF INTENTION TO PROCEED TO REDUCTIONS ARE REDUCED BY THE MEMBER STATES OF NATO TO THE LEVEL OF EMPTY GOOD WISHES.

28. THE SOCIALIST STATES EXPECT THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL RE-EXAMINE THEIR POSITIONS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO MOVEMENT FORWARD ON THE WAY TO REALISATION OF THE COMMON TASK - REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ONE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE DELEGATIONS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES WILL BE ABLE TO USE THE FORTHCOMING RECESS FOR THESE PURPOSES. TO ENTER ONTO THE PATH OF REALISM, IN SEARCH OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS, TO REFRAIN FROM FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN FOR ONESELF UNILATERAL CONFIDENTIAL

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ADVANTAGES, DULY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES - THIS IS WHAT IS NEEDED ON THE PART OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

29. ALREADY AT THE BEGINNING OF OUR WORK IN VIENNA ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW TREATY WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS DEFINITELY AND CLEARLY EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS SUBSTANTIALLY TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND TO ASSUME CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS FOR THESE PURPOSES. THEY MAINTAIN SUCH A POSITION NOW AS WELL, WHICH IS WELL KNOWN NOT ONLY TO THOSE IN THIS ROOM BUT ALSO TO THE BROAD CIRCLES OF PUBLIC OPINION.

30. THE COUNTRIES OF NATO ARE NOT READY FOR A REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THEIR RELUCTANCE TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND, AS NOW HAS BECOME CLEAR, THE RELUCTANCE OF THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE THAT THEY WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES EVEN IN A SECOND PHASE ARE PREVENTING PROGRESS IN OUR WORK.

31. IF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF THE SOCIALIST STATES AND REALLY MANIFEST THE INTENTION TO PROCEED TO THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES AGREED IN THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS, THEN WE COULD PROCEED TO THE PRACTICAL WORKING OUT OF THE FIRST CONCRETE DECISIONS. PEOPLE ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE AND BEYOND EXPECT THIS FROM THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

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